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CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - DESPITE DIS-
CREPANCY BETWEEN PRIOR DESCRIPTION AND DEFEND-
ANT'S ACTUAL APPEARANCE, EYEWITNESS' TESTIMONY OF 
PRETRIAL AND IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS OF DEFEND-
ANT IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION. 
Branch v. State, 305 Md. 177, 502 A.2d 496 (1986). 
A woman was robbed at gunpoint by two men 1 and immediately 
reported the incident to the police. 2 The woman described the gunman 
as a black male, five feet seven inches tall, fifteen to sixteen years of age, 
and weighing 110 to 125 pounds. 3 Three and one-half hours after the 
incident, the investigating officer had the woman look through two books 
containing approximately 600 photographs, but the woman was unable 
to identify the gunman. The officer then took from his pocket three pho-
tographs, one of which the woman identified as the gunman. The de-
fendant, when the incident occurred, was six feet three inches tall, 
nineteen years of age, weighed 185 pounds, and had two front teeth miss-
ing.4 At the jury trial, the woman identified the defendant as the gun-
man. 5 Despite the discrepancies between the woman's initial description 
of the gunman and the physical appearance of the defendant, 6 the jury 
found the defendant guilty of robbery with a deadly weapon and use of a 
handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. 7 The conviction was 
affirmed by both the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland8 and the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. 9 The court of appeals held that the iden-
tification testimony of a single eyewitness was sufficient as a matter of 
law to sustain the conviction. 10 
If an appeal is based upon a due process violation that alleges insuffi-
ciency of evidence, the reviewing court must determine whether the rec-
ord evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding of guilt. In Jackson 
1. Beatrice Mudge was robbed by two black men on April 14, 1983 at approximately 
7:00 a.m. while walking to work. One of the men pointed a gun at her and grabbed 
her purse while the other acted as the lookout. The men escaped on foot. Brief for 
Appellant at 2, Branch v. State, 305 Md. 177, 502 A.2d 496 (1986). 
2. Branch, 305 Md. at 178, 502 A.2d at 496. 
3. I d. at 178, 502 A.2d at 496. The description also identified the gunman as wearing a 
dark jacket and carrying a silver handgun. Id. 
4. Id. at 179, 502 A.2d at 496. 
5. Id. at 179, 502 A.2d at 497. 
6. Id. at 185, 502 A.2d at 500. The defense also presented two alibi witnesses. The 
defendant's girlfriend testified that she was in bed with the defendant in the bed-
room they shared at her mother's house until approximately 10:00 a.m. on the 
morning of the robbery. The defendant's aunt testified that on April 14, 1983 at 
approximately 10:00 a.m. she went to the home of the defendant's girlfriend where 
she found the defendant dressed in his nightclothes in the bedroom. Id. 
7. The defendant was sentenced to fifteen years for robbery with a deadly weapon and 
five years for the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, to run 
consecutively. Brief for Appellant at 1-2, Branch v. State, 305 Md. 177, 502 A.2d 
496 (1986). 
8. Branch v, State, No. 84-351, slip op. (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 4, 1984). 
9. Branch, 305 Md. 177, 502 A.2d 496. 
10. Id. at 184, 502 A.2d at 499. 
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v. Virginia, 11 the Supreme Court established a constitutional standard for 
appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence. Concluding that due pro-
cess requires the use of the reasonable doubt standard at all levels of the 
criminal process, 12 the Court held that courts reviewing the sufficiency of 
the evidence must determine whether any rational fact finder, after re-
viewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
tion, could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.B Maryland courts have developed a sufficiency stan-
dard which is consistent with that espoused in Jackson. 14 
A majority of jurisdictions hold that the uncorroborated testimony 
of a single eyewitness is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. 15 Pro-
fessor Wigmore states the rule as follows: "In general, the testimony of a 
single witness, no matter what the issue or who the person, may legally 
suffice as evidence upon which the jury may found [sic] a verdict." 16 
Courts follow this "one-witness" rule because the testimony of an eyewit-
ness is frequently the only evidence in the prosecution's case and is per-
haps the most convincing evidence that the prosecution can offer a jury 
11. 443 u.s. 307 (1979). 
12. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment protects a defendant against conviction except 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime charged. Prior to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), a federal habeas 
corpus court would find a state conviction unconstitutional only if the charge were 
totally devoid of evidentiary support. See Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 
(1960). 
13. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EviDENCE§ 2495, at 391 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1981). 
14. Williams v. State, 5 Md. App. 450,459,247 A.2d 731,737 (1968); accord Bedford v. 
State, 293 Md. 172, 176 n.1, 443 A.2d 78, 80 n.1 (1982); State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 
240, 424 A.2d 720, 728 (1981). Maryland established appellate review of sufficiency 
of evidence in criminal cases in 1950 by constitutional amendment. Mo. CONST. 
art. XV § 6 (prior to 1950 amendment) provided, "In the trial of all criminal cases, 
the Jury shall be the Judges of the Law, as well as of fact." Mo. CoNST. D. OF R., 
art. 23 (art. XV as amended in 1950, and transferred to Declaration of Rights) 
provides: "In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as 
well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence 
to sustain a conviction." See generally Williams, 5 Md. App. 450, 247 A.2d 731 
(tracing statutory development of appellate review of sufficiency); Editorial, Crimi-
nal Procedurai Reform Achieved in Maryland, 11 Mo. L. REv. 319 (1950) (review-
ing the effects of the amendment as adopted in November 1950 election). The first 
case to apply this amendment was Shelton v. State, 198 Md. 405, 84 A.2d 76 (1951), 
in which the court of appeals held that it would not reverse the judgment of the 
lower court if there were any proper evidence before the jury that would sustain a 
conviction. /d. at 412, 84 A.2d at 80. 
15. See, e.g., U.S. v. Larios, 640 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1981);U.S. v. Hoskins, 628 F.2d 295 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980); U.S. v. Danzey, 594 F.2d 905 (2nd 
Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 951 (1979); Shelton v. State, 382 So. 2d 1175 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1980); I.R. v. State, 385 So. 2d 686 (Fla. App. 1980); People v. Perez, 94 
Ill. App. 3d 377, 418 N.E.2d 969 (1981); Sheckles v. State, 272 Ind. 509,400 N.E.2d 
121 (1980); People v. Richards, 76 Mich. App. 695, 256 N.W.2d 793 (1977); State v. 
Newberry, 605 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1980); State v. Radi, 176 Mont. 451, 578 P.2d 1169 
(1978). 
16. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2034, at 343 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). 
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to prove the defendant's guiltY Courts also favor submitting identifica-
tion evidence to juries for a determination of its accuracy because courts 
credit juries with the ability to appreciate and evaluate the complexities 
of eyewitness identifications. 18 Maryland courts follow the majority view 
in applying the one-witness rule. 19 
Several legal and psychological experts hold a contrary view.20 
These experts state that certain conditions exist that are not within the 
purview of the average juror and may detract from the accuracy of eye-
witness identification.21 For example, the human mind practices selec-
tive perception that can cause a witness to a crime to fail to observe those 
details that are crucial for an accurate identification. 22 
Additionally, psychological studies show that perceptual abilities 
are impaired when a witness is exposed to unexpected or stressful situa-
tions. The witness' defense mechanism is to focus only on aspects of a 
situation that seem most important, such as an escape route or the pres-
ence of a weapon. 23 The desire to reduce uncertainty and eliminate in-
consistencies may cause a witness to fill in memory gaps by adding 
extraneous details to the perceived image.24 These latent weaknesses are 
exacerbated by the tendency of a jury to place great faith in eyewitness 
testimony, even in the face of information that discredits it.25 Although 
17. See United States v. Levi, 405 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1968) (discussing the rationale for 
the one-witness rule and the reasons for its persistence); Woocher, Did Your Eyes 
Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness 
Identification, 29 STAN. L. REv. 969, 969 (1977). 
18. Woocher, supra note 17, at 995-96. See generally N. SOBEL, EYEWITNESS IDENTI-
FICATION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 6-4 (2d ed. Supp. 1985) (discussing 
factors considered by courts to establish reliability). 
19. See, e.g., Mobley v. State, 270 Md. 76, 89, 310 A.2d 803, 811 (1973) (single eyewit-
ness' identification of defendant as perpetrator of robbery held sufficient to convict); 
Walters v. State, 242 Md. 235, 237-38, 218 A.2d 678, 678 (1966) (victim's identifica-
tion is ample evidence to sustain a conviction for assault); Davis v. Warden, 235 
Md. 637, 639, 201 A.2d 672, 672-73 (1964) (identification by one eyewitness, if be-
lieved, is sufficient); Coates v. State, 232 Md. 72, 74, 191 A.2d 579, 579 (1963) 
(identification of accused by single eyewitness was held sufficent to sustain convic-
tion for robbery with a deadly weapon). 
20. See generally SOBEL, supra note 18, at 9-30.3 Gurors rarely perceive the dangers of 
identification procedures); Woocher, supra note 17 (examining psychological dimen-
sions of eyewitness identification as compared to factors that jurors find significant 
in reviewing identification evidence); E. LoFTUs, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 9-18 
(1979) (discussing the impact of eyewitness testimony on jurors). 
21. Woocher, supra note 17, at 970. 
22. Woocher, supra note 17, at 977-85. See generally S. BARTLEY, PRINCIPLES OF PER-
CEPTION (2d ed. 1969); J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY IN CONFLICT 11-44 
(1966); Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from 
Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1079 (1973). 
23. Woocher, supra note 17, at 980. 
24. /d. at 982-83. One expert characterizes the identification procedure as a multiple 
choice test lacking a "none of the above" alternative. The implicit suggestion that 
the criminal is present in the array may cause the witness to perceive his task as one 
of identifying the person who best matches the witness' recollection. /d. at 986. 
25. Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Witness, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, 
Dec. 1974, at 1114. 
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psychological experiments suggest that there is no relationship between 
confidence and accuracy, jurors believe assertive, confident witnesses 
more readily than less confident witnesses.26 Despite the wealth of liter-
ature indicating that eyewitness testimony is inherently unreliable but is 
nonetheless frequently regarded as credible by juries, the burden of as-
sessing the value of eyewitness testimony generally rests with the jury.27 
Recognizing that the one-witness rule may lead to unjust results be-
cause of the problems inherent in eyewitness identifications, two courts 
have sought to temper its harsh effects. In United States v. Levi, 28 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit identified four 
factors affecting the reliability of an uncorroborated identification by one 
witness to determine whether a substantial likelihood of irreparable mis-
identification existed:29 ( 1) the lapse of time between the occurrence of 
the crime and the first confrontation; (2) the opportunity of the witness 
to identify during the crime as compared to the opportunity of other 
witnesses who were unable to identify; (3) the reasons for the failure to 
conduct a line-up or use similar techniques short of a line-up; and ( 4) the 
judge's appraisal of the witness' capacity to observe and remember facial 
and other features. The court held that a trial judge could refuse to sub-
mit a one-witness identification case to the jury if he were not persuaded 
that the identification was in all probability accurate based upon these 
factors. 3° Following Levi, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in United States v. Butler,31 also adopted a modified 
application of the one-witness rule. 32 
The Levi approach, which demonstrates concern with the reliability 
of eyewitness identifications, finds support in the line of Supreme Court 
cases dealing with the admissibility of eyewitness testimony. In a trilogy 
of cases decided on the same day in 1967, the Supreme Court focused on 
the constitutional implications of eyewitness testimony. In United States 
v. Wade, 33 the Court held that the sixth amendment to the United States 
26. /d. See a/soP. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 15-16 
(1965). 
27. Smith v. State, 51 Md. App. 408, 443 A.2d 985 (1982). 
28. 405 F.2d 380. In Levi, the defendant moved for acquittal at the close of the govern-
ment's case. The trial judge denied the motion on the basis that the record substan-
tiated a finding of guilt. /d. at 383. 
29. /d. The Levi court prefaced the test by stating that a judge should also consider the 
demeanor, appearance, and degree of certainty of the witness. /d. 
30. /d. 
31. 636 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981). 
32. /d. at 729. The defendant's claim of insufficiency of the evidence was based on the 
unreliability of uncorroborated testimony and alibi proof. The court affirmed the 
conviction and stated that the trial judge, in deciding whether a one-witness case 
should go to the jury, must consider the following factors to determine whether the 
totality of circumstances gives rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification: (1) the opportunity for identification; (2) the lighting conditions; 
(3) the duration of encounters; (4) the strength of the identification; and (5) the 
judge's appraisal of the witness' capacity to observe. /d. 
33. 388 u.s. 218 (1967). 
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Constitution provided the right to have counsel present at pretrial identi-
fication procedures.34 The Court recognized that the dangers inherent in 
eyewitness identifications and the unavoidable suggestiveness of the pro-
cedures presented a risk of unfairness to the accused, 35 and held that 
counsel's presence was necessary to promote fairness and to ensure the 
defendant the opportunity to fully litigate the issue of identification. 36 In 
Gilbert v. California,37 the Court held that an in-court identification de-
rived from an uncounselled pretrial identification procedure would be ex-
cluded unless corroborated by an independent source of identification.38 
In Stovall v. Denno, 39 the Court indicated that pretrial identification pro-
cedures could violate the due process rights of the accused under the 
fifth40 and fourteenth41 amendments if such procedures were "unneces-
sarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification. "42 
Five years later, in Neil v. Biggers,43 the Court turned its focus from 
suggestiveness of the procedure to the reliability of the identification to 
determine the admissibility of identification evidence. The Court rea-
soned that the unreliability stemming from certain procedures, and not 
34. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967). 
35. Jd. at 229-35. The suggestive manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect 
to the witnesses for pretrial identification is a factor contributing to the dangers 
inherent in eyewitness identification. ld. at 228-29. Suggestive procedures are iden-
tification procedures conducted in a manner that suggest guilt. Placing the accused 
in handcuffs or asking "is this the man?" would imply that the accused is guilty. P. 
WALL, supra note 26, at 20; see also SOBEL, supra note 18, at 1-4 to 1-5. 
A line-up, rather than a photo identification or show-up, should be conducted 
unless circumstances make the use of the line-up impractical. A show-up will al-
ways be slightly suggestive because the witness is given no other choice. Photo iden-
tifications are also less preferable because they may be dated. Thus, a properly 
conducted line-up is generally the best means for an accurate pretrial identification. 
!d. 
36. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37. The presence of counsel at the confrontation will aid the 
defendant in reconstructing at trial any unfairness that occurred at the confronta-
tion. Counsel also will be better able to detect conditions prejudicial to the defend-
ant, reveal any improper influences, and attack the credibility of a courtroom 
identification. Id. at 230-32. 
37. 388 u.s. 263 (1967). 
38. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967). In Gilbert, the Court attempted to 
eliminate the possibility that an in-court identification would be predicated upon a 
witness' pretrial identification conducted in violation of the defendant's sixth 
amendment right to have counsel present. The state must show that the in-court 
identification was of an independent origin and was not tainted by the illegal pretrial 
procedure. Id. 
39. 388 u.s. 293 (1967). 
40. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "No person shall 
... be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process oflaw .... " U.S. 
Const. amend. V. 
41. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "[N]or shall 
any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law 
.... " U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
42. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). 
43. 409 u.s. 188 (1972). 
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the suggestiveness of those procedures, violated due process.44 The Court 
identified five factors which should be applied to determine whether an 
identification procured by an unnecessarily suggestive procedure is relia-
ble:45 (1) the opportunity of the witness to observe the criminal at the 
time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of 
the witness' prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty 
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length of 
time between the crime and the confrontation. If these factors indicate 
that the identification is reliable, evidence of the identification is admissi-
ble even though the identification was procured by an unnecessarily sug-
gestive procedure.46 
In Manson v. Brathwaite,47 the Court reiterated its support for those 
factors listed in Biggers.48 The Court held that pretrial identifications 
obtained through unnecessarily suggestive procedures are admissible pro-
vided the identification possesses features of reliability.49 Following 
Brathwaite, lower courts applied a two part test to determine whether 
identification evidence procured by suggestive procedures is admissible. 50 
If the procedure is not inherently suggestive, further inquiry is unneces-
sary and the evidence is admissible. 51 If the procedure is inherently sug-
gestive, the reliability factors listed in Biggers must be applied. 52 The 
evidence is deemed admissible only if the positive factors or reliability 
44. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972). 
45. Id. at 199-200. 
46. Emergency or exigent circumstances sometimes require that police conduct an iden-
tification procedure in a suggestive manner in order to obtain an identification. For 
example, in a situation where the only witness to the crime is critically injured, the 
police may be justified in employing suggestive procedures to procure the identifica-
tion. Outside of the emergency or exigent situations, the procedure will be deemed 
unnecessarily suggestive. See Stovall, 388 U.S. 293. 
47. 432 u.s. 98 (1977). 
48. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977). 
49. I d. The Court noted that in the wake of the Biggers decision, the federal courts of 
appeal had developed two approaches to identification evidence: the per se ap-
proach and the reliability approach - also referred to as the totality of circum-
stances approach. Under the per se approach, pretrial identifications obtained 
through unnecessarily suggestive procedures are per se inadmissible. This test im-
plicates two aspects of the procedure: the degree of suggestiveness (permissive or 
impermissive), and necessity (exigent or emergency circumstances may require that 
the procedure be conducted before counsel can be present). The per se approach 
allows the admission of testimony concerning a subsequent identification if the iden-
tification is determined to be reliable. Id. at 110 n.lO. In comparing the reliability 
approach with the per se approach, the Court found that the reliability approach 
best served the interests of society for determining admissibility of identification 
evidence. The Court identified three societal interests: (1) preventing unreliable 
evidence from reaching the jury; (2) deterring improper police procedures; and 
(3) furthering the administration of justice. Id. at 111-13. The Court also indicated 
two sources of distortion of an eyewitness' recollection: (1) circumstances surround-· 
ing the witness' observation of the crime; and (2) later actions of the police con-
ducting the identification procedure. ld. at 112. 
50. SOBEL, supra note 18, at 4-8. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 4-9. 
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outweigh the suggestiveness of the procedure. 53 Maryland courts follow 
this interpretation. 54 
In Branch v. State,55 the Court of Appeals of Maryland, relying 
upon the one-witness rule, held that the uncorroborated testimony of a 
victim56 is sufficient to sustain a conviction. 5 7 The court did not view the 
victim's inaccurate description of the gunman as an inconsistency affect-
ing the sufficiency of the evidence, but rather as a factor to be considered 
by the jury in assessing the credibility of the witness. 58 
Branch presented the Court of Appeals of Maryland with the oppor-
tunity to adopt the Levi approach 59 and thereby consider the reliability of 
53. /d. at 4-10. Some jurisdictions specifically require the weighing of the prejudicial 
effect of the suggestive procedure against the Biggers factors to determine reliability. 
Under this test, only evidence found to be both suggestive and unreliable would be 
suppressed. Id. at 4-10. See, e.g., U.S. v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 643 (5th Cir.) (iden-
tification procedure is not unduly suggestive when witness inadvertently observes 
defendant; such identification is likely to be reliable), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1109 
(1982); U.S. v. Mefford, 658 F.2d 588, 590 (8th Cir.) (photo display not suggestive; 
even if photo display were suggestive, identification would have been admissible be-
cause Biggers reliability factors were satisfied), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1089 (1981). 
In a third version of the two part test, courts assume the suggestiveness of the proce-
dures and automatically proceed to the second part of the test, applying the factors 
to determine whether the evidence possesses the requisite indicia of reliability. Pro-
ject, Twelfth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court 
and Courts of Appeals 1981-1982, 71 GEO. L.J. 339, 421 (1982). 
54. See, e.g., Rustin v. State, 46 Md. App. 28, 33-36,415 A.2d 631, 634-35 (1980) (trial 
court erred in admitting pretrial identification evidence when the suggestiveness of 
the procedure outweighed the reliability factors); Adams v. State, 43 Md. App. 528, 
542-43, 406 A.2d 637, 645-46 (1979) (suggestive line-up identification held admissi-
ble; under totality of circumstances, identification was reliable and there was no 
substantial likelihood of misidentification), aff'd, 289 Md. 221, 424 A.2d 344 
(1981); Bonner v. State, 43 Md. App. 518, 523, 406 A.2d 646, 649-50 (1978) (relia-
bility factors were applied to evaluate the likelihood of misidentification; finding of 
reliability precluded exclusion on basis of impermissive suggestiveness). 
55. 305 Md. 177, 502 A.2d 496 (1986). 
56. Although the testimony was characterized as that of a victim, the court did not 
identify a difference between testimony by a victim and a nonvictim when determin-
ing the reliability of an identification. Branch v. State, 305 Md. 177, 183, 502 A.2d 
496, 499 (1986). 
57. /d. The court did not address the issue of suggestiveness because it was not raised 
on appeal. /d. at 178 n.1, 502 A.2d at 496 n.l. 
58. Id. at 183-84, 502 A.2d at 499. In the dissent, Judge Eldridge criticized the major-
ity's harsh application of the one-witness rule. /d. at 184-90, 502 A.2d at 499-502. 
Judge Eldridge responded to the arguments set forth by the parties and to the issue 
of reliability of eyewitness testimony. /d. See Brief for Appellant at 8-12, Branch v. 
State, 305 Md. 177, 502 A.2d 496 (1986) (citing cases demonstrating unreliability of 
eyewitness identification). But see Brief for Appellee at 5-11, Branch v. State, 305 
Md. 177, 502 A.2d 496 (1986) (citing cases holding that discrepancies in description 
do not negate the value of subsequent identifications). Judge Eldridge discussed the 
reliability factors to illustrate the unreliability of the identification and cited civil 
cases in which the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized the inherent unreliabil-
ity of eyewitness testimony. /d. at 186-90, 502 A.2d at 500-02. In the absence of 
other indicia of reliability, Judge Eldridge argued against the application of the one-
witness rule. /d. at 190, 502 A.2d at 502. 
59. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30. 
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a witness' identification in determining the legal sufficiency of the evi-
dence. Unfortunately, the Branch court adhered to the principle of stare 
decisis and maintained its alliance with the majority of jurisdictions by 
strictly applying the one-witness rule. 60 The one-witness rule is too con-
venient a mechanism for finding sufficiency. By permitting a court to 
satisfy the due process standard without a meaningful review of the evi-
dence, the majority's approach to the one-witness rule evades the 
problems inherent in the area of eyewitness identifications.61 The Levi 
approach affords a more comprehensive review of the evidence. By as-
suring that juries hear only eyewitness testimony that passes the four 
factor test for reliability, 62 the Levi approach renders a more accurate 
result in jury trials. If the Maryland judiciary were to adopt the Levi 
approach, it would prevent unreliable information from reaching the 
jury. Consequently, fewer convictions would result from less than relia-
ble evidence, thus serving the ultimate public policy of reducing the like-
lihood of convicting innocent persons. 
By characterizing the discrepancy between the description of the 
gunman and the actual appearance of the defendant as an element going 
to the weight rather than the sufficiency of evidence, 63 the Branch court 
allowed for an interpretation that the discrepancy should affect only the 
jury's assessment of the credibility of the witness and should not be an 
indication that the identification was unreliable. The discrepancies in 
Branch indicated either an inaccurate description or a misidentification 
by the witness and should have alerted the court to the questionable reli-
ability of the identification. 64 In suggestive procedure cases, the Supreme 
Court has held that an inaccurate prior description may indicate an unre-
liable identification. 65 The Supreme Court articulated that the driving 
force behind the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy was the concern with the 
problems inherent in eyewitness identification. 66 The emergence of the 
reliability test set forth in Biggers suggests that the Supreme Court has 
recognized the importance of looking beyond the mere fact of an eyewit-
ness identification and focusing instead on the accuracy of that identifica-
60. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19. 
61. See supra text accompanying notes 20-27. 
62. For the reliability test set forth in Levi, see supra text accompanying note 29. Cf 
Biggers reliability factor (3), supra text accompanying note 45. 
63. Branch, 305 Md. at 184, 502 A.2d at 499. 
64. Compare supra text accompanying note 3 with supra text accompanying note 4. 
65. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1967). In Biggers, the Court identified reliability 
of an identification as the key issue in determining the validity of a due process 
claim. /d. at 199. The Court stated that it was the likelihood of misidentification 
that violated the right to due process. /d. at 198. Stating that "reliability is the 
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony," the 
Brathwaite Court magnified the importance of preventing convictions based upon 
unreliable identification evidence. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). 
See generally Grossman, Suggestive Identifications: The Supreme Court's Due Pro-
cess Test Fails to Meet its Own Criteria, 11 U. BALT. L. REv. 53, 58, 71 (1981). 
66. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112. 
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tion. 67 Although the identification in Branch was not procured by an 
unnecessarily suggestive procedure, based upon the policy set forth by 
the Supreme Court, the Branch court could have brought the reliability 
of the evidence into the scope of review in determining whether the evi-
dence was sufficient to support a conviction. 
By identifying the discrepancy as an element going to weight rather 
than the sufficiency of the evidence, the court also implicitly delegated 
the authority to determine the reliability of the evidence to the jury.68 
This delegation reflects the court's faith in the competency of the fact-
finding body, but it is inconsistent with established Supreme Court pol-
icy69 and opinions of legal and psychological commentators in the area of 
eyewitness identifications.70 Despite substantial evidence pointing to the 
innocence of the accused, most jurors will place unwarranted faith in the 
veracity of the eyewitness.71 Therefore, the presence of eyewitness identi-
fication in a jury trial provides an increased likelihood that a conviction 
will result. Notwithstanding the trust that the Branch court places in the 
competency of the jury, trial courts should be aware that jurors may not 
be cognizant of the hazards inherent in eyewitness identification 
testimony.72 
Criminal defense attorneys can reduce the impact of the Branch 
court's holding by focusing the jury's attention on the weaknesses of eye-
witness identification, 73 introducing expert testimony on factors that af-
fect the accuracy of the identification, 74 and requesting special jury 
. instructions on the fallability of eyewitness identification. 75 In addition, 
ifthe identification procedure is suggestive, the defense attorney should 
move to suppress the identification. 76 The court of appeals has failed to 
address the problems underlying eyewitness testimony; therefore, it is im-
67. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46. 
68. Branch, 305 Md. at 184, 502 A.2d at 499. The reviewing court cannot measure the 
weight of the evidence. Cf Smith v. State, 51 Md. App. 408, 443 A.2d 985 (1982). 
The function of the appellate court in reviewing a ruling on a motion for acquittal is 
not to inquire into and measure the weight of evidence, but merely to determine 
whether there is legally sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. Id. at 418, 443 
A.2d at 991. 
69. See supra text accompanying notes 33-54. 
70. See supra text accompanying notes 20-26. 
71. LOFTUS, supra note 20, at 9. 
72. For a discussion of weaknesses of eyewitness identifications, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 22-26. 
73. Id. 
74. See generally Grossman, supra note 65, at 99-108 (suggesting that expert psycholog-
ical testimony is helpful in explaining the impact of suggestive procedures upon 
reliability, but the use of expert testimony in every case involving eyewitness identi-
fication could cause delays effecting judicial economy). 
75. For the leading decision on cautionary instructions, see U.S. v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 
552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stressing several factors which the jury should con-
sider in weighing eyewitness testimony). See generally Woocher, supra note 17, at 
1002-05. 
76. See MD. R. 4-251 (motion in district court) and MD. R. 4-252 (mandatory motions 
in circuit court). 
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perative that counsel take measures to reduce the likelihood that the jury 
will convict an innocent defendant on the basis of a mistaken 
identification. 
In Branch v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland perpetuates 
the life of the anachronistic one-witness rule. Although the decision rests 
upon a solid foundation of prior case law, it disregards the inherent 
weaknesses of eyewitness identification testimony. The factual discrep-
ancy in Branch presented the court of appeals with the opportunity to 
adopt the Levi approach and consider the reliability of the evidence in 
determining its sufficiency. Instead, the court employed a mechanical 
application of the one-witness rule that creates a precedent with the po-
tential to restrict the due process rights of persons criminally accused. 
Lisa Kristine Hoffman 
